Cryptanalyzing an improved security modulated chaotic encryption scheme
  using ciphertext absolute value by Alvarez, G. et al.
ar
X
iv
:n
lin
/0
40
60
65
v1
  [
nli
n.C
D]
  2
8 J
un
 20
04
Cryptanalyzing an improved security
modulated chaotic encryption scheme using
ciphertext absolute value
G. A´lvarez*, F. Montoya, M. Romera, G. Pastor.
Instituto de F´ısica Aplicada, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cient´ıficas,
Serrano 144, 28006 Madrid, Spain
Abstract
This paper describes the security weakness of a recently proposed improved chaotic
encryption method based on the modulation of a signal generated by a chaotic
system with an appropriately chosen scalar signal. The aim of the improvement is
to avoid the breaking of chaotic encryption schemes by means of the return map
attack introduced by Pe´rez and Cerdeira. A method of attack based on taking the
absolute value of the ciphertext is presented, that allows for the cancellation of the
modulation scalar signal and the determination of some system parameters that play
the role of system key. The proposed improved method is shown to be compromised
without any knowledge of the chaotic system parameter values and even without
knowing the transmitter structure.
Key words: Chaos, cryptography, nonlinear systems, security of data,
telecommunication.
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1 Introduction
The possibility of synchronization of two coupled chaotic systems was first
shown by Pecora and Carrol [1,2,3]. The importance of this discovery was
quickly appreciated [4,5], and soon this topic aroused great interest as a po-
tential means for communications [6,7,8]. In recent years, a considerable effort
has been devoted to extend the chaotic communication applications to the field
of secure communications. Accordingly, a number of cryptosystems based on
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chaos has been proposed [9,10,11,12,13]; some of them fundamentally flawed
by a lack of robustness and security [14,15,16,17,18].
Pe´rez and Cerdeira showed in [19] that it was possible to retrieve the data
encrypted by chaos when a parameter of the sender is switched between two
values. The data were recovered directly from the ciphertext signal, without
using the authorized receiver and even without reconstructing the dynamics
of the chaotic system, by means of the attractor of a return map. Later this
method was further developed by Yang et al. in [20].
Recently Bu and Wang [21] proposed an improved chaotic encryption method.
The aim of the improvement is to foil the return map attack to chaotic en-
cryption schemes of [19,20]. The proposed approach is illustrated by means of
a Lorenz system, described by the following equations:


x˙1 = σ(x2 − x1)
x˙2 = rx1 − x2 − x1x3
x˙3 = x1x2 − bx3
(1)
being σ, r and b the system internal parameters.
In the literature, when digital encryption takes place, the signal s = x1(t) is
commonly taken as the transmitted encrypted message. The authors of [21]
propose as ciphertext the modulation signal s(x, t) = g(t) x1(t).
The modulation signal g(t) should be an appropriately chosen scalar signal.
For the Lorenz dynamical system they propose to choose g(t) as the prod-
uct of a sinusoidal factor times a variable of the chaotic system: g(t) =
A cos(ωt + ϕ0) x3(t). Hence, the transmitted ciphertext will be: s(x, t) =
A cos(ωt+ ϕ0) x1(t) x3(t).
The key of the system is composed by the unknown values of the system
internal parameters together with the, so called, external parameters ω and
ϕ0, thus considerably enlarging the key space with respect to the simple chaotic
encryption.
The authors of [21] show that the attractor of the return map of the ciphertext
is blurred by the modulation and, consequently, they claim that an intruder
can not retrieve any information from it. They also show that the Fourier
power spectrum of the ciphertext does not allow for the knowledge of the
frequency ω of the sinusoidal factor.
The authors seem to base the security system on the impossibility of perform-
ing a return map attack and determining the sinusoidal modulating signal;
but no general analysis of security is included. The weaknesses of this system
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Fig. 1. Time story of the variables x1(t), x2(t), and x3(t) of of the Lorenz system.
and a method to break it are discussed in the next section.
2 Ciphertext absolute value attack
In this section is presented an attack to the proposed improved security encryp-
tion scheme based on taking the absolute value of the ciphertext. Our attack
allows for the system breaking in two different ways. The first one consists of
retrieving the plaintext directly from the ciphertext, when digital encryption
is used. The second one consists of the identification and cancelation of the
modulating signal cos(ωt+ ϕ0), allowing the plaintext recovery by the return
map attack, thus circumventing the alleged system security improvement.
The Lorenz attractor has a complicated shape, with trajectories spiralling
around, and jumping between two loops, either in three dimensions or in any
two-dimension projection.
It is interesting to look at the time story and frequency power spectrum of each
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Fig. 2. Power spectral density of the variables x1(t), x2(t) and x3(t) of the Lorenz
system.
component of the Lorenz system. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the variable x3(t)
shows a quasi sinusoidal oscillation, always of positive value, whose amplitude
changes in an irregular sawtooth like fashion; while the variables x1(t) and
x2(t) show a similar behavior but with sudden large amplitude jumps across
the zero axis, corresponding to the attractor jumps between loops.
The frequency power spectra of the Lorenz system variables are illustrated
in Fig. 2. As observed, x3(t) has a relative clean and simple spectrum, with
a narrow band at 13.7 rad/sec, that corresponds to the stable frequency of
its oscillatory waveform. However, the variables x1(t) and x2(t) have a much
broader and complex spectra, with maximum amplitude near 3 rad/sec, due
to the aperiodic jumps across the zero axis.
Let us take the absolute value of the two first Lorenz system variables: y1(t) =
|x1(t)|, y2(t) = |x2(t)|. When computing the time stories and frequency power
spectra of y1(t) and y2(t) the results illustrated in Fig. 3 are obtained. Both
time stories resemble very much that of x3(t), while their frequency power
spectra are practically indistinguishable from that of x3(t). That is, a new set
of signals y1(t) and y2(t) has been built, whose waveform and spectra are much
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Fig. 3. Power spectral density and time story of |x1| and |x2| of the Lorenz system.
simpler than the ones of the original variables. In fact, when substituting x1(t)
or x2(t) with y1(t) or y2(t) the double scroll is converted into a simple scroll
with quite regular motion.
It is assumed in the literature that chaotic modulation is an adequate means
for secure transmission, because chaotic maps present some properties as sen-
sitive dependence on parameters and initial conditions, ergodicity, mixing,
and dense sinusoidal points. These properties make them similar to pseudo-
random noise [22], which has been used traditionally as a masking signal for
cryptographic purposes.
A fundamental requirement of the pseudorandom noise used in cryptography
is that its spectrum should be infinitely broad, flat, and of higher power density
than the signal to be concealed within. In other words, any information power
spectrum should be buried into the pseudorandom noise power spectrum.
If any of the Lorenz system variables x1(t) or x2(t) is used as a carrier signal
for secure transmission, an attacker can take its absolute value to build a new
signal with much simpler shape and spectrum. This new signal does not satisfy
the above conditions. As a consequence, it may still preserve some plaintext
information within, certainly alleviating the task of breaking the system.
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Fig. 4. Full wave amplitude detector: (a)ciphertext signal; (b) plaintext; (c) low-pass
filtered absolute value of the ciphertext signal; (d) recovered plaintext.
2.1 Direct plaintext recovery
The main problem with this kind of cryptosystems lies on the fact that the
ciphertext is an analog signal, whose waveform depends on the system param-
eter values. When a parameter is switched between two different values by
a digital plaintext [23], the system changes between two different attractors
with different waveforms, amplitudes and frequencies. Therefore it is possible
to extract some information by a suitable signal processing of the ciphertext.
To illustrate the possibility of breaking the system, the chaotic transmitter of
[21, §2 and fig. 4] has been simulated with the same parameter values of the
example, that is: (A, ω, ϕ0) = (0.5, 1.5, 0.0), being the parameter b changed
between its reference value b0 = 4.0 when the values 0’s are to be transmitted
and b1 = 4.4 when the values 1’s are to be transmitted. The parameter values
have been arbitrarily chosen as: (σ, r) = (16, 45.6) and the system initial
conditions as: (x1(0), x2(0), x3(0)) = (−5.8, 2, 2.41). Our simulation was done
with a four order Runge-Kutta integration algorithm in MATLAB 6 with a
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Fig. 5. Power spectral density of the ciphertext signal: (a) spectrum of the trans-
mitted signal A cos(ωt + ϕ0)x1(t)x3(t); (b) spectrum of the absolute value of the
transmitted signal |A cos(ωt+ ϕ0)x1(t)x3(t)|.
step size of 0.001.
To break the system a so called full wave amplitude detector has been im-
plemented, consisting of taking the absolute value of the ciphertext signal
s(x, t) = A cos(ωt + ϕ0) x1(t) x3(t). Next, this signal is low-pass filtered and,
finally, binary quantized. The low-pass filter employed is a six pole Butter-
worth with a frequency cutoff of 1 rad/sec. The quantizer is a level comparator
with switch point at level value 8 of the low-pass filtered absolute value of the
ciphertext signal.
The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 4. The result is a good estimation of the
plaintext, with tiny inaccuracies consisting of small delays in the transitions,
due to the time delay introduced by the filter. It should be emphasized that our
analysis is a blind detection, made without the least knowledge of what kind
of non-linear time-varying system was used for encryption, nor its parameters
values and neither its keys.
2.2 Modulating signal cancellation
In the encryption method proposed in [21] the ciphertext signal s(x, t) =
A cos(ωt+ ϕ0) x1(t) x3(t) shows a crowded frequency power spectrum as is il-
lustrated in Fig. 5(a). As the authors point out, it is impossible to identify in it
any separated factor that can be exploited to attack the system. This is a con-
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sequence of the use of the Lorenz system and the modulating procedure. First,
the spectrum of x1(t) x3(t) is a complicated one, due to the chaotic nature of
the Lorenz system. Second, the multiplication of this signal by A cos(ωt+ϕ0)
has the effect of generating a new spectrum composed by the superposition of
two versions of the x1(t) x3(t) spectrum shifted ±ω radians per second. And
third, the value chosen for ω falls in the neighborhood of the maximum of the
spectrum of x1(t) x3(t), hence it is impossible to identify it from the frequency
power spectrum.
The aim of this encryption method is to foil the return map attack, by blurring
the attractor of the return map. In Fig. 6 the attractor of the transmitted
signal s(x, t) is plotted when digital encryption takes place in two different
cases. In Fig. 6(a) without sinusoidal factor:
s(x, t) = x1(t) x3(t), (2)
and in Fig. 6(b) when the sinusoidal factor is present:
s(x, t) = A cos(ωt+ ϕ0) x1(t) x3(t), (3)
where (A, ω, ϕ0) = (0.5, 1.5, 0.0), being the system parameters for encryption
(σ, r, b0, b1) = (16, 45.6, 4.0, 4.4). It can be seen that when there is no sinusoidal
modulation factor it is possible to use the return map attractors to retrieve
the plaintext, because it is clearly distinguishable the splitting of the attractor
segments originated by the plaintext presence. But when there is a sinusoidal
modulating factor the attractors happen to by fully blurred, obstructing any
straightforward analysis.
To break such encryption scheme the following procedure is proposed, which
will allow for the reconstruction of the return map attractor.
First the frequency of the sinusoidal factor is identified from the ciphertext by
computing the Discrete Fourier Transform of the ciphertext absolute value.
Let ω′ be the approximate value of ω and ϕ′
0
the approximate value of ϕ0.
As is illustrated in Fig. 5(b) it can be seen that there is a very neat pick in
the spectrum exactly at 2ω′ = 3 rad/sec, which corresponds to the double of
the sinusoidal factor frequency. This is due to the non linear nature of the
absolute value function, which has the effect of folding the ciphertext upwards
around the zero axis, effectively doubling the frequency of the sinusoidal fac-
tor. The part of the spectrum corresponding to the Lorenz system factor,
s(x, t) = Ax1(t) x3(t), appears as a band of frequencies near 13.7 rad/sec. Fi-
nally, there are two small amplitude side bands at 13.7±3 rad/sec, correspond-
ing to the cross-modulation between the sinusoidal modulation factor and the
Lorenz system factor. The spectrum was calculated using a 16384 point Dis-
crete Fourier Transform with a 4-term Blackman-Harris window.
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Fig. 6. Attractor of the return map of the ciphertext signal: (a) clean attractor of
an ideal signal with no sinusoidal factor 0.5x1(t)x3(t); (b) blurred attractor of the
actual transmitted signal with sinusoidal factor 0.5 cos(1.5 t)x1(t)x3(t).
Fig. 7. Zero crossing phase identification of ϕ′
0
Once the sinusoidal factor frequency ω′ is estimated, it is a trivial task to
determine its phase ϕ′
0
just searching for the ciphertext zero crossing points
at intervals equal to pi/4ω′, as depicted in Fig. 7.
Next, the approximate cancellation of the sinusoidal factor must be performed.
Let x′
1
and x′
2
be the approximate values of x1 and x2. Should the determi-
nation of ω′ and ϕ′
0
be exact it would be satisfactory to divide the ciphertext
signal s(x,t) by the estimated sinusoidal factor cos(ω′t + ϕ′
0
) to get rid of it,
as:
Ax′
1
(t) x′
3
(t) =
A cos(ωt+ ϕ0)x1(t)x3(t)
cos(ω′t + ϕ′0)
(4)
But, in practice, small inaccuracies in the determination of ϕ′
0
can lead to a
division by cero, with infinite amplitude error. If the error ε = ϕ′
0
− ϕ0 is
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Fig. 8. Reconstruction of the attractor of the return map of the ciphertext signal
digitally modulated, for various values of the error ε = ϕ′
0
− ϕ0: (a) ε = 0, 0005
radians; (b) ε = 0.001 radians; (c) ε = 0.01 radians;
ε ≥ 0.001 radians it would be better to add some constant value η around the
zero level of the estimated sinusoidal factor, as follows:
Ax′
1
(t) x′
3
(t) =
A cos(ωt+ ϕ0)x1(t)x3(t)
sgn[cos(ω′t + ϕ′0)] | cos(ω
′t + ϕ′0) + η|
(5)
Finally, once the cancellation of the sinusoidal modulation has been per-
formed, the return map attractor can by plotted. After simulating the recon-
struction of the return map attractor of the example of 2.1, the results are
presented in Fig. 8. It can be seen that the return map attractor is recon-
structed with enough accuracy to enable the return map attack described in
[19,20], thus deceiving the improved security claimed by the authors of [21].
In our simulation Eq. (4) was used to reconstruct the attractor with a ϕ0
determination error value of ε = 0, 0005 radians; while for errors values of
ε = (0.001, 0.01) radians, equivalent to 0.06 and 0.6 degree, Eq. (5) was used,
with η values of 0.001 and 0.005, respectively.
3 Conclusion
The lack of security of the encryption method proposed in [21] is made evident,
since it can be broken without knowing its parameter values and even without
knowing the transmitter’s precise structure. A new method that can retrieve
the plaintext and determine part of the key directly from the ciphertext has
been devised. As a result of our attack, the security of the proposed encryption
scheme does not improve over the traditional chaotic encryption methods,
being still vulnerable to the same attacks it intends to foil.
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